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Experience with Modified Aerospace Reliability and Quality 
Assurance Method for Wind Turbines* 
William E. Klein 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Lewis Research Center 
Cleveland, Ohio 
Abstract Description of Original Design 
This paper describes the original Safety, 
Reliability and Quality Assurance (SR&QA) approach 
developed for the first large wind turbine generator 
project, Mod OA. The SR&QA approach to be used had 
to assure that the machine would not be hazardous to 
the public or operating personnel, would operate un-
attended on a utility grid, would demonstrate reli-
able operation and would help establish the quality 
assurance and maintainability requirements for future 
wind turbine projects. Since the utlimate objective 
of the wind energy program is to provide wind power 
at a cost competitive with other energy sources, the 
final SR&QA activities were to be accomplished at a 
minimum of cost and manpower. The final approach 
consisted of a modified Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis (FMEA) during the design phase, minimal 
hardware inspection during parts fabrication, and 
three simple documents to control activities during 
machine construction and operation. Five years 
experience has shown that this low cost approach has 
worked well enough that it should be considered by 
others for similar projects. 
Introduction 
The NASA Lewis Research Center is conducting 
research and development of large horizontal axis 
Wind Turbine Generators (WTG's) for the Department 
of Energy as one phase of the overall Federal Wind 
Energy Program. Wind turbines ranging in size from 
100 kilowatts (kW) to 4000 kW have been designed and 
built as part of this program. Two machines of about 
7200 kW are presently in the design stage. The ob-ject of the program is to develop wind turbines which 
will generate electricity at a cost which is competi-
tive with alternatives, particularly oil. This paper 
describes the SR&QA approach originally developed 
for the first large wind turbine project, Mod OA, a 
200 kW, l25-foot diameter machine. This project has 
been a combination of in-house and contracted effort 
and is a unique joining of aerospace technology and 
standard utility practices. This project formed the 
base for future development of large wind turbines 
and this SR&QA approach was subsequently applied to 
other NASA/DOE WTG projects. 
*Revised version of NASA TM-79284, "Modified 
Aerospace Reliability and Quality Assurance Method 
for Wind Turbines," by William E. Klein presented at 
the Reliability and Maintainability Symposium, 
January 22-24, 1980. 
A photograph of one Mod OA machine, located on 
Culebra Island, Puerto Rico, is shown as Fig. 1. 
Three similar machines are located in Clayton, New 
Mexico, on Block Island, Rhode Island, and on Oahu, 
Hawaii. The two blades measure 125 feet, tip-to-tip. 
The hub centerline is 100 feet above ground level. 
The blades rotate at 40 rpm on two machines and 
31.5 rpm on the other two machines. The blades are 
mounted on the rotor hub, as shown in the cutaway 
drawing included as Fig. 2. The pitch actuator 
pitches the blades through a set of bevel gears 
located inside the hub. The hub is attached to a low 
speed shaft which drives a speed increaser gearbox. 
In the original design, a high speed shaft transmitted 
power to V-belts which drove a synchronous alter-
nator. Each machine is housed in an 8-foot diameter 
nacelle and is mounted on a turntable bearing located 
on top of a truss tower. A yaw drive system keeps 
the machine aligned with the wind. 
In the original deSign, the wind turbine was 
controlled by a microprocessor, two closed loop servo 
systems, and a safety system. The microprocessor is 
the heart of the control system. It monitors machine 
status and wind conditions. When the wind speed 
reaches 10 mph, the microprocessor signals the pitch 
controller to start pitching the blades, gradually 
increasing blade rotation. When the alternator 
reaches synchronous speed, it is synchronized with 
the utility grid. After synchronization, the blades 
remain in the full power pOSition, generating in-
creasing power as the winds increase, until the full 
output of 200 kW is reached at a wind speed of about 
20 mph. As winds increase further, the blades pitch 
towards the feather position, spilling some of the 
wind, to maintain the 200 kW output. 
If the power drops below -10 kW, the machine is 
shut down. If the wind speed increases above 40 mph, 
the machine is shut down to avoid high blade loads. 
When the wind speed drops back to 35 mph, the machine 
is restarted. The microprocessor also monitors sev-
eral noncritical variables to shut the machine down 
if necessary. 
In the original design, one closed loop servo 
system regulated the pitch of the blades. Blade 
pitch regulates machine speed from initial blade 
rotation until synchronization with the utility grid 
and regulates the power generated after synchroniza-
tion. The second closed loop servo measured the 
difference between the actual wind direction and the 
nacelle direction to keep the machine aligned with 
the wind. The machine operates with the blades 
downwind and is kept aligned within 25° of the wind 
direction. 
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The safety system, as the name implies, measures 
several operating variables, shutting the machine 
down if any of these variables go out of limits. 
These variables include speed, current, pneumatic and 
hydraulic pressures, several temperatures, and vibra-
tion. In most cases, the safety system shutdown 
signal goes into the microprocessor, but there are 
several signals which directly shut the machine down, 
regardless of what the microprocessor, the control 
system, or the safety system are doing. 
Background 
The Reliability and Quality Assurance (R&QA) 
Office was given the responsiblity to determine the 
safety, reliability, and quality assurance program 
that was to be initiated for these machines. The 
program had to be low cost and was further compli-
cated by a unique combination of in-house and con-
tract effort. The machine was designed in-house. 
Originally , this was a one machine program with 
options for two more machines. The schedule was very 
tight. Therefore, Lewis Research Center ordered a 
few long-lead items for all three machines, several 
additional items for two machines, and all hardware 
for the first machine . The Department of Energy 
quickly exercised the options for the additional two 
machines. The first machine was assembled in-house. 
The contractor was responsible for erection of the 
first machine, assembly and erection of the second 
machine (including the purchase of the remaining 
parts), and essentially all phases of the third 
machine. When the fourth machine was added later, 
the contractor was given total responsiblity for that 
machine. This meant that the SR&QA program had to 
operate under several combinations of in-house and 
contracted effort. The operation of the machine by 
the utility also had to be considered. 
Safety and Reliability Approach 
After considering numerous R&QA and safety tech-
niques, a modified FMEA was chosen to be the main 
tool for listing and analyzing the various possible 
failures, and the results or effects of those fail-
ures. For the purposes of this project, the FMEA was 
performed for each functional mode of a system, sub-
system, or component. 
The analysis was qualitative in nature and the 
actual probability of occurance of a failure was not 
considered. However, the more probable failures were 
considered for possible redesign or addition of re-
dundant systems, particularly for the failures that 
would have severe consequences. The basic ground 
rule used throughout the analysis was that no single 
point failure would be catastrophic even if a previ-
ous undetected failure had already occurred. For 
~i ng le point failure items such as the blades, tower, 
ma chine bedplate, etc. it was verified that the item 
had been designed to a safe operating life with a 
significant factor of safety. 
The FMEA has been used extenSively for design 
and operational safety reviews. It emphasizes the 
criticality of some hardware such as blades and hub. 
While performing the FMEA, it soon became obvious 
~hat a significant overspeed would be the worst pos-
sible failure, since it could result in throwing a 
blade. The consequences of all other failures would 
be relatively minor by comparison. Based on this 
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finding, several design changes were made and redun-
dant systems added. A disc brake was added to the 
high speed shaft to stop the rotor, even with the 
blades in the full power position. Also, a redundant 
overspeed switch was added that would operate the 
brake directly, rather than acting through the safety 
system as most of the other sensors do. The FMEA 
gives project management a qualitative evaluation of 
the degree of the risk the design imposes on both 
personnel and machine safety. Trade offs of degree 
of risk versus the need for additional redundancy or 
periodic inspection or mai ntenance can then be as-
sessed. The FMEA has proven very useful when new 
design changes were being considered. 
To complete the reliability phase of the original 
program, a simple Discrepancy Report (DR) form was 
developed as the main failure reporting system. A 
sample DR is included in Fig. 3. The DR form is also 
used to track failure analysis, when required, to 
assure initiation of eng ineering changes and to help 
control configuraton. The form is based on dis-
crepancy and failure report forms used in earlier 
programs and works quite well . 
Experience showed us that critical components 
need to be i nspected at the vendors plant during 
machining and assemb ly to save cost and schedule 
problems later. We also found that it was wise to 
perform some inspection and checkouts of the more 
important fabricated hardware, such as the switch-
gear. Where inspection at the vendors plant was not 
practical, receiving inspection activity was aug-
mented. Highly stressed unique hardware such as the 
blades and hub were of particular concern. Further 
developments indicated the need to maintain dimen-
sional records of critical components during assembly 
and maintenance operations to allow a continuing 
assessment of component performance in areas such as 
wear rates of bearings, deformation of structural 
elements, etc. The one area where it has not been 
necessary to perform much inspection is for com-
mercial, off-the-shelf components. We have experi-
enced very few difficulties in this area. 
Two more activities round out the qua lity 
efforts on the project. An Engineering Work Order 
form is used to document changes made to the system. 
This form is virtually identical to the DR form in 
Fig. 3, except for the Material Review Board items. 
This form documents the change to be made and is used 
for configuration control. The form also assures all 
personnel that the project manager has given his ap-
proval to make the change. Finally, a daily log is 
kept for each phase of the project to record all 
significant activities. 
Most of the above discussions relating to Dis-
crepancy Reports, Engineering Work Orders, inspecton 
records (for recording dimensions, etc.) and the 
daily log was basically for our in-house efforts. 
However, we have been very successful in having each 
of our contractors and each utility use their own 
internal paperwork system to perform the intent of 
each of the above documents. The contractors main-
tain a daily log to comp lete the the R&QA require-
ments. Each utility maintains a daily log and 
reports all failures on their weekly summary re-
ports. The reader can refer to Ref. 1 for more 
details on the original SR&QA program and how it was 
set up. 
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Early experince with the first machines indi-
cated that several design changes were desireabJe. 
The contractor was made totally responsible ·for most 
of the changes, including the design, changing draw-
ings, work coordination, etc. One example included 
changing the alternator to a direct drive system, 
eliminating a longer high speed shaft, t~o high speed 
bearings and the drive belts. This change has been 
made only on the fourth machine at this point. The 
project still desires to maintain the flexibilty of 
being able to change rotor speeds by changing the 
belts and pulleys on two of the machines. A decision 
has not been made on converting the fourth machine. 
A second example involved adding an additional wind 
speed sensor mounted on the top of the nacelle. This 
sensor axis is fixed parallel to the nacelle so that 
the sensed wind speed acts as a redundant check on 
both wind speed and direction. This eliminated the 
need to use signals from the meterological tower and 
greatly simplified the hardware that was needed to 
perform the redundant checks. A third example was to 
use the yaw error signal, which was already in the 
microprocessor, to command the yaw function of the 
machine. This completely eliminated one of the 
closed loop control systems. These last two changes, 
plus several more minor changes, made the micro-
processor and the control program more complicated, 
but eliminated a large amount of electronics and a 
number of relays. Experience has shown that the 
microprocessor has been much more reliable than most 
of the other electronic hardware. 
The above changes were listed for several rea-
sons. The original SR&QA program maintained the 
desired controls on the work performed and the proper 
configuration control, while maintaining the required 
redundancy and maintaining safe operation. Each 
change was reviewed to be sure that it improved the 
reliability and/or safe operation of the machine. 
Each change was also thoroughly reviewed against the 
FMEA to be sure that the safety or reliability guide-
lines were not compromised. Because of the numerous 
changes to the program, we have just completed a con-
tract which updated the FMEA. The FMEA was complete-
ly reviewed and updated as necessary. The periodic 
reviews performed prior to each change have fulfilled 
a useful function, because there were no safety prob-
lems or lack of redundancy uncovered during the 
update. 
As the machines have gained operating time and 
federal manpower cutbacks have occurred, more and 
more of the maintenance and inspection activites have 
been contracted out. Contracts have been awarded to 
the utilities to do the routine maintenance and 
inspection activities. Also, the original machine 
contractor is taking over more and more .of the non-
routine maintenance and inspection activities. As 
this change has been taking place, virtually no 
change in the original SR&QA approach has been 
necessary. 
A wind turbine experience data bank has been 
established for all of the wind turbines in the 
Department of Energy/NASA programs (Mod OA, Mod 1, 
Mod 2, etc.). A summary of all Discrepancy Reports, 
Engineering Work Orders, and Project Information 
Release reports (PIR's) are being entered into the 
data bank. (A PIR is an informal report that allows 
preliminary release of machine performance data, 
trade-off studies, design information, etc.) The 
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search program is very flexible and allows searches 
by system, sub-system, part, dates, machine number, 
plus many other choices. The program will also 
calculate MTBF for any desired category. This has 
proven very valuable and time saving when the 
operating experience on some part or system is 
desired. A printout of a sample search is included 
as Table 1. 
Conclusion 
The SR&QA approach described above was initiated 
on what was basically a research and development pro-
ject and then revised and expanded as the project 
evolved. Part of the safety and reliability require-
ments are met .by performing a modified FMEA during 
the design phase. A Discrepancy Report is used to 
record all failures and discrepancies. Part of the 
quality requirements are met by performing some 
vendor inspections and inspecting all machined items 
and most of the fabricated items upon delivery. An 
inspection report is kept, recording all important 
dimensions. An Engineering Work Order form is used 
for configuration control. A daily log rounds out 
the quality control activities. 
This SR&QA approach has been successful in 
assuring safe operation of the units and in demon-
strating those aspects of standard safety, reli-
ability and quality practices which are most 
applicable and cost effective to this type hardware. 
We have been getting good dimensional data on criti-
cal hardware and we have a good record of the con-
figuration of each machine. The first Mod OA has 
accumulated 12,000 hours of synchronized time and 
has reached a Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) of 
360 hours. The accumulated run time of all four 
machines has reached 34,000 hours with a MTBF of 
450 hours. Although this sounds low, several 
utilities have told us they feel this is excellent 
for this stage of a development program for a new 
power source. Experience has shown that the SR&QA 
approach we developed for the Mod OA program has 
been suffficiently successful that similar approaches 
are being instituted on the newer, more advanced 
machines leading to low cost commercialization of 
wind turbines. 
The SR&QA approach described in this paper has 
worked well enough that we are recommending that such 
an approach be considered for other projects of simi-
lar complexity. The prime considerations are that 
the SR&QA approach needs to be simple, reasonable, 
and flexible. 
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TABLE I. - SAMPLE DATA BANK SEARCH 
DATE OF REQUEST---FEBRUARY 11. 1982 
SAMPLE DATA BANK SEARCH FOR TM-82803 lOA-I. PITCH SYSTEM. FLUID COUPLING) 
PROGRAM 
OA 
REPORT TYPE 
FA IlURE 
PART NAME 
FLUID COUPLING 
MANUFACTURER 
MACHINE NUMBER 
1 
MICROFICHE # 
31 
REPORT OATE 
DEC 3 77 1773371 
SERIAL NUMBER 
MODEL NUMBER 
REFERENCE DOCUMENTS 
REPORT NAME 
DR 
SYSTEM 
PITCH 
DRAWING NUMBER 
DEUBLIN COUPLING LEAKING. DEUBLIN REPLACED. 
PROGRAM 
OA 
REPORT TYPE 
~'ODIFICATION 
PART NAME 
FLUID COUPLING 
MANUFACTURER 
~'ACHINE NUMBER 
1 
MICROFICHE # 
40 
REPORT DATE 
JAN 4 78(78004) 
SERIAL NUMBER 
MODEL NUMBER 
REFERENCE DOCUMENTS 
EWO 2091 
REPORT NAME 
DR 
SYSTEM 
PITCH 
DRAWING NUMBER 
REPORT NUMBER 
2030-1 
SUB-SYSTEM 
HYD SUPPLY 
SYNC TIME 
o 
REPORT NUMBER 
2038 
SUB-SYSTEM 
HYD SUPPLY 
SYNC TIME 
11 
COAXIAL FLOW LINE NOT CENTERED---RUBBING ON WIRES IN 40 RPM SLIP 
RING. COLLAPSED SPONGE MATERIAL WHICH CENTERS DEUBLIN IN BRACKET 
PROGRAM MICROFICHE # REPORT NAME 
o A 69 DR 
REPORT TYPE REPORT DATE SYSTEM 
FAILURE SEP 11 78(78254) PITCH 
PART NAME SERIAL NUMBER DRAWING NUMBER 
FLUID COUPLING 
MANUFACTURER 
~' ACHINE NUMBER 
1 
MODEL NUMBER 
REFERENCE DOCUMENTS 
EWO 2133 
H.P. DEUBLIN LEAKS. H.P . DEUBLIN REPLACED. 
PROGRAM 
OA 
REPORT TYPE 
FAILURE 
PART NAME 
FLUID COUPLING 
MANUFACTURER 
MACHINE NUMBER 
1 
MICROFICHE # 
143 
REPORT DATE 
AUG 13 79(79225) 
SERIAL NUMBER 
MODEL NUMBER 
REFERENCE DOCUMENTS 
REPORT 
DR 
SYSTEM 
PITCH 
DRAWING 
HIGH PR ESSURE DEUBLIN COUPLING FAILED. 
NAME 
NUMBER 
REPORT NUMBER 
2066 
SUB-SYSTEM 
HYD SUPPLY 
SYNC TIME 
1873 
REPORT NUMBER 
2099 
SUB-SYSTEM 
HYD SUPPLY 
SYNC TIME 
o 
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Figure 1. - MOD OA Wind Turbine at Culebra Island, Puerto Rico. 
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Figure 2. - cutaway drawi ng of tower mounted equipment. 
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Figure 3. - Typical discrepancy report. 
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